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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) confers original jurisdiction over this appeal, which is
an appeal from an order entered in a domestic relations case.

ISSUES P R E S E N T E D A N D S T A N D A R D OF R E V I E W

Issue: Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to Petitioner
where the Trial Court, in determining Petitioner's need for alimony, included child-related
expenses as part of Petitioner's monthly expenses, yet failed to adequately consider the
monthly Child Support payments receive from Respondent as part of Petitioner's ability to
meet her monthly expenses?
Standards of Review: Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 260 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and
property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Homllv. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court must make explicit
findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. Montoya v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194
(Utah 1985).
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PRESERVATION OF T H E ISSUES

The issue, regarding the Trial Court's calculation of Petitioner's need for alimony,
was preserved during the trial ruling (see R. at 498; Ruling transcript at 12, 13-25), in a timely
post-trial Rule 52(b) Motion for Clarification of Findings of Fact (see R. at 315), and in a timely
post-trial Notice ofAppeal (see R. at 454).
R E L E V A N T STATUTORY A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O V I S I O N S
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(8)(a):

(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony;
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE

Nature of the Case: This appeal resulted from a domestic relations case heard in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The issue on appeal arises out of the
determination of alimony support made by the Trial Court. Respondent argues that the Trial
Court erred in its determination of alimony and that said error amounts to an addressable
abuse of discretion.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
2

Course of Proceedings: On or about September 23, 2005, SHERRIE C ELOFF
(Petitioner / Appellee) petitioned for a divorce from her husband, BRUCE C ELOFF
(Respondent /Appellant). See R. at 1. As part of said Petition, Petitioner requested alimony
See R. at 5. The issue of alimony came before the Trial Court by way of a Bench Trial on June
12, 2007. See R. at 262. The Trial Court, after hearing arguments, entered its Ruling and
resulting determination of alimony on June 13, 2007 See R. at 264.
Disposition in the Court Below On July 19, 2007, the Trial Court entered a Decree of
Divorce {see R. at 288) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflMw (see R. at 269) On July 26,
2007, Respondent filed a timely Motion for Clarification of Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 52(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure See R. at 315. On September 19, 2007, m a Minute
Entry entitle Minute Entry and Order Denying Respondent's Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Decree, and Motion for Clarification, the Trial Court denied Respondent's Motion for
Clarification of Findings of Fact {see R. at 404) and declared, "This signed Minute Entry shall
constitute the Order of the Court resolving the matters referenced herein, no further Order is
required" (see R. at 405) Respondent then filed a timely Notice ofAppeal on October 19, 2007
SeeR at 454.
Statement of Facts: At trial the Parties agreed that, for child support purposes,
Petitioner would be deemed to have income of $3,137 per month. See R. at 498 (Trial
transcript at 5, 20-24). The Parties also agreed that, for child support purposes, Respondent
would be deemed to have income of $6,760 per month See R. at 498 (Trial transcript at 6, 2-
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3). Additionally, the Parties agreed that Child Support would be paid by Respondent to
Petitioner (see R. at 498 (Trial transcript at 6; 21-23)) and that the agreed upon income
amounts would be used to calculate the base child support amount. See R. at 498 (Trial
transcript at 23; 13-23). The resulting Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered on July 19,
2007, indicate that Petitioner would receive from Respondent an adjusted child support
amount of $818.26 per month (adjusted from a base child support amount of $941.12). See R.
at 274.
At trial, the Trial Court heard arguments regarding Petitioner's gross income and
Petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15).
Petitioner claimed total monthly expenses of $4,198.99. See R. at 251. This expense amount
included expenses for the Children as well as for the Petitioner. Id. Based on the evidence
presented and after having made adjustments, the Trial Court found, for alimony purposes,
Petitioner's gross income to be $3,137 and Petitioner's reasonable and necessary monthly
expenses to be $3,461. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). The Trial Court concluded
that Petitioner suffered a shortfall in the amount of $324. Id.
Also at trial, the Trial Court heard arguments regarding Respondent's gross income
and Respondent's reasonable and necessary expenses. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 1625). Based on the evidence presented, the Trial Court found, for alimony purposes,
Respondent's gross income to be $6,760 and Respondent's reasonable and necessary monthly
expenses to be $4,372. Id. The Trial Court then concluded that Respondent had the ability to
pay alimony, and consequently, the Trial Court ordered that Respondent pay Petitioner
alimony support in the amount of $324 per month. Id.
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In making the alimony determination ruling, the Trial Court held the following
conversation (see R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 12, 13-25)*
Mr. Reading: Yeah. Okay. And your Honor, at this point, a clarification Back
to the alimony issue, you mentioned that the Petitioner had $3,137, that
included, I guess, the child support?
Mr. McPhie: N o .
The Court. No. I did not include that child support in the calculation and I
cited it as a gross amount of her income.
Mr. Reading: And - and so that was not taken into account to help pay those
expenses?
The Court It was taken into account, but it was not included by me as income
for alimony purposes.

On July 7, 2007, Respondent filed a Motion for Clarification of Finding of Fact pursuant to
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein Respondent requested that the Trial
Court articulate its basis in fact and law as to not including the child support award of $818 26
per month when determining Petitioner's ability to meet her monthly needs for the purposes
of alimony. See R. at 315 Respondent's request was denied on September 19, 2007, m a
Minute Entry from the Trial Court
SUMMARY O F T H E A R G U M E N T S

In determining alimony, courts are required to consider the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient spouse or ability of
recipient spouse to produce income, and the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) It is an abuse of discretion to fail to adequately consider the
aforementioned factors in determining alimony. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah Ct. App.
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1987) Trial courts are required to make findings on each of these factors and said findings
must follow logically from, and be supported by, the evidence

Andrus v Andm\, 169 P 3d

754, 759 (Utah Ct App 2007) Failure to do so is reversible error Id
In the case at hand, in determining alimony, the Trial Court erred in its analysis of the
Petitioner's financial condition and thereby overstated the financial needs of the Petitioner
In determimng Petitioner's financial condition and ability to produce income, the Trial Court
did not include the $818 26 monthly child support payments Petitioner receives from
Respondent At the same time, m determining Petitioner's needs for alimony support, the
Trial Court did include the monthly child-related expenses This calculation method had the
effect of increasing Petitioner's monthly expenses (by including the Children's monthly
expenses), while simultaneously decreasing Petitioner's monthly income (by not including the
child support payments) As a result, the Trial Court mis-characterized Petitioner's financial
condition and artificially inflated Petitioner's financial needs
Therefore, the Trial Court's failure to adequately consider the financial conditions and
need of Petitioner was an addressable abuse of discretion, and the Trial Court's failuie to
adequately consider the ability of Petitioner to produce sufficient income for herself was an
addressable abuse of discretion The resulting alimony determination was in error because it
failed to meet the requirements under Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(8)(a) and was not was not
supported by the findings Moreover, the alimony determination did not follow logically
from, nor was it supported by, the evidence. Thus, Trial Court abused its discretion in
determining alimony and the resulting alimony support award should be reversed
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Determining Alimony Because
the Trial Court Failed to Adequately Evaluate the N e e d s and Financial
Condition of the Petitioner

The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife Medley v. Medley, 93 P 3d
847, 849 (Utah Ct. App 2004) (relying on Georgedes v Georgedes, 627 P 2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981)
An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage Munns v. Munns, 790 P 2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct
App 1990) While the awarding of alimony and the fixing of the amount thereof are within
the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not arbitrary, and the award or
refusal to award is subject to correction on appeal if it is erroneous on its face or unjust to
either party Vnedh v. Fnedh, 238 P 647, 648 (Utah 1925)
In determining alimony, a trial court must consider three factors (1) the financial
condition and need of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support Munns v. Munns, 790 P 2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct App.1990) (Also see Noble v
Noble, 761 P 2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988), Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), and
Haumont v Haumont, 793 P 2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct App 1990)) These factors are commonly
referred to as the "Jones Factors." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App
2003). Failure to adequately consider the three factors is an abuse of discretion Id.
In Bingham, the court reversed and remanded the judgement of the trial court because
the trial court failed to adequately consider the financial needs and condition of Ms. Bingham
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(Wife). Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). There, Mr. Bingham
(Husband) argued that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Wife more alimony
than her expenses necessitated. The trial court awarded Wife $1,431.76 in child support and
$1,750.00 in alimony for a total monthly support payment of $3,181.76. At trial, Wife
estimated her overall monthly expenses at $3,080. After further evaluation, the trial court
reduced Wife's overall monthly expenses by $600 and thereby assessed Wife's overall monthly
expenses at $2,480. Therefore, as the reviewing court noted, the trial court awarded Wife an
excess of $701.76 per month over Wife's established financial need requirement. In holding
that the trial court abused its discretion, the reviewing court stated; "Where the trial court has
offered no explanation for such a discrepancy, we agree with [Husband] that the court should
not have awarded [Wife] more than her established need required, regardless of [Husband's]
ability to pay this excess amount. Accordingly, we remand the case for a reassessment of the
alimony award in accordance with the precept that the spouse's demonstrated need must,
under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d
1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The facts in case at hand are similar to those in Bingham. By not including child support
payments as part of Petitioner's financial condition and needs, the Trial Court also abused its
discretion in awarding Plaintiff more alimony than her expenses necessitated. The Trial
Court, in the case at hand, awarded Petitioner $818.26 in child support {see R. at 274) and
$324 in alimony {see R. at 498(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15)) for a total monthly support
payment of $1,142.26. At trial, Petitioner estimated her overall monthly expenses, including
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child-related expenses, at $4,198.99. See R. at 251. Just as in Bingham, the Trial Court, upon
further evaluation, reduced Petitioner's overall monthly expenses by the amount of $737.99
and thereby assessed Petitioner's overall monthly expenses at $3,461. See R. at 498 (Ruling
transcript at 5; 7-15). The Trial Court held that Petitioner's gross income is $3,137 and
therefore, Petitioner's resulting need for alimony was $324. Id. In giving its Ruling, the Trial
Court stated that it did not include child support in the calculation. Id. This is in error and the
Trial Court did not adequately evaluate Petitioner's financial condition and needs. Further,
the Court gave no explanation as to its reasoning for excluding the child support payments
from its financial condition and needs analysis. Id.
Here, Petitioner receives $818.26 in monthly child support payments. See R. at 498
(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). If this is added to the $3,137 monthly income of Petitioner, as
is required in an adequate evaluation of Petitioner's financial condition and needs, it can be
seen that Petitioner has $3,955.26 per month to address her $3,461 overall monthly expenses;
or a $494.26 monthly surplus. Therefore, the Trial Court awarded Petitioner an excess over
her established financial need requirement. Thus, the $324 alimony award is not necessary and
said award does not reflect Petitioner's true financial condition or needs as the courts require.
As in Bingham, Petitioner was awarded an excess over her established financial need
requirement; therefore, just as in Bingham, this Court of Review should hold that the Trial
Court should not have awarded Petitioner alimony in excess of her established need,
regardless of Respondent's ability to pay this excess amount. This Court should hold that the
Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony determination by not establishing Petitioner's
true financial condition or needs as required by the Jones Factors.
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II.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Determining Alimony Because
the Trial Court Failed to Enter Specific Findings on the N e e d s and
Financial Condition of the Petitioner

In considering the Jones Factors, the trial court is required to make adequate factual
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are clear, un-controverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540,
546 (Utah C t App. 1993). If the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of
alimony, the reviewing court will not disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. However, where a trial court
fails to enter specific findings on the needs and condition of the recipient spouse, making
effective review of the alimony award impossible, that omission is an abuse of discretion.
Bakanowski v. Bakanoivski, 80 P.3d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Detailed findings of fact
and conclusions of law are necessary for the reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination of the alimony award was rationally based. Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2d 952, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In Bakanowski, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to enter specific findings on Ms. Bakanowski's (Wife) needs and financial condition.
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the Court of
Appeals noted that the pertinent facts in the record were not clear, un-controverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Id. At trail, the court found
Wife's monthly living expenses of $5,259 to be inflated. Rather than evaluating Wife's
monthly budget, the trial court ruled that Wife could not enjoy a similar standard of living as
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Husband without a $1,000 monthly award. The trial court then concluded that Wife
demonstrated a need for alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month and ordered Mr.
Bakanowski (Husband) to pay said alimony.
In holding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining alimony, the
reviewing court paid particular attention to the trial court's failure to adequately determine
Wife's financial condition and needs. The court of appeals noted that the trial court, upon
finding that Wife's monthly living expenses to be inflated, explicitly avoided evaluating her
monthly needs and her ability to meet those needs. The court of review also noted that in
attempting to equalize the parties income, the trial court, neglected to employ the traditional
needs analysis and as such the trial court abused its discretion. In finding an abuse of
discretion, the court of review stated; "The absence of findings of fact is a fundamental defect
that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial
court's fact-finding domain. The findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or
decree follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80
P.3d 153, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Here, we suffer from the same abuse of discretion as the reviewing court found in
Bakanowski. In the case at hand, we cannot say that the Trial Court's decree follows logically
from, and is supported by the evidence as is required under Bakanowski. This is because, here,
the Trial Court also avoided evaluating Petitioner's monthly need and her ability to meet those
needs. In its findings, the Trial Court simply stated the Parties gross income in the amounts
the Parties agreed upon for the purposes of a child support determination. See R. at 498
(Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). In this regard, the Court failed to enter specific findings on the
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financial needs and condition of Petitioner. This is in error and said omission not only
amounts to an abuse of discretion, but the omission makes effective review of the alimony
award impossible. The Trial Court refused to include the child support Petitioner receives
from Respondent. See R. at 498 (Ruling transcript at 13; 12-25). Like in Bakanomki, this falls
short of an adequate evaluation of Petitioner's monthly needs and her ability to meet those
needs. Additionally, the Trial Court in the case at hand "made some adjustments" to
Petitioner's claimed expenses by reducing Petitioner's monthly expenses to $3,461. See R. at
498 (Ruling transcript at 5; 7-15). There are no findings as to which expenses were adjusted
or how the court arrived at the reduced monthly expense amount. Id. Again, in this regard,
the Court failed to enter specific findings on the financial needs and condition of Petitioner.
This is in error and said omission not only amounts to an abuse of discretion, but the
omission makes effective review of the alimony award impossible.
Therefore in the case at hand, like in Bakanomki, the Trial Court did not make
sufficient findings concerning Petitioner's true financial condition and needs. The Trial Court
neglected to employ the traditional needs analysis and as such the trial court abused its
discretion. Thus, the absence of findings of fact is a fundamental defect that makes it
impossible to review the issues without invading the trial court's fact-finding domain, and the
findings of fact in the instant case do not show that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by the evidence as required.
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CONCLUSION

Trial Court abused its discretion in determining alimony because the Trial Court failed
to adequately consider the financial condition and needs of the Petitioner. The Petitioner was
awarded an excess over her established financial need requirement; therefore, this Court of
Review should hold that the Trial Court should not have awarded Petitioner alimony,
regardless of Respondent's ability to pay this excess amount. This Court should hold that the
Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony determination by not establishing Petitioner's
true financial condition or needs as required by the Jones Factors.
Additionally, the Trial Court neglected to enter specific finding on the needs and
financial condition of the Petitioner. The Trial Court neglected to adequately employ the
traditional needs analysis and as such the Trial Court abused its discretion. The absence of
findings of fact is a fundamental defect that makes it impossible to review the issues without
invading the Trial Court's fact-finding domain, and the findings of fact in the instant case do
not show that the Court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by the
evidence as required. For the forgoing reasons, the Trial Court abused its discretion in
determining alimony award and said alimony award should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<£ day of May, 2008.

SCALLEY R E A D I N G BATES
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.

J. Bruce Reading
Mitchell T. Brooks
Attorneys for Appellant
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SHERRIE C. ELOFF,
Petitioner,

Case No. 054905322 DA
RULING

vs
BRUCE C. ELOFF,
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of June, 2 0 07,
commencing at the hour of 4:04 p.m., the above-entitled matterj
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY,
sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of
this cause, and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOo-
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For the Respondent:
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Attorney at Law
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Salt Lake City, Utah
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For the Petitioner:

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

THE COURT:

Yes.

And--and by the way, I have--I'm

going to do something just slightly different on that T.R.O.,
not--not very different, but just slightly different.
Exactly.
And I'll explain that to you-I won't need you to do that, but I'll explain that
after we get through this matter.

So, can I hang up now?

you going to send them in?

Yeah, I'm sure--

I'm--yes.

Okay.

Are

All right.

Are both of you there?

Okay.

I need to put you on

hold so that I can get you on my speaker phone, okay?

So,

hold on.
Okay.

Are both of you still there?

MR. READING:
MR. McPHIE:
THE COURT:

We are.
I am.
Okay.

And Mr. McPhie, your voice

sounded just slightly distant.
MR. McPHIE:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Yes.

Can you speak-Is this better now?

Yes.

That is better.
3

MR. McPHIE:
THE COURT:

Okay.
And by the way, this is case numbered

054905322 and we are on the record at this time and since vve
are on the record, let's start with counsel for the petitioner
and just for the record purposes, identify yourself, please.
MR. McPHIE:

Yes.

David McPhie for the petitioner,

S h e m e Eloff .
MR. READING:

Bruce Reading on behalf of Bruce

Eloff.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Counsel, as you are aware, this

is the time I set for ruling on the issues that were submitted
to me for resolution.

Yesterday we had a trial m

particular divorce case.

this

The majority of the issues were

resolved by way of stipulation and only a few issues remain.
Initially, because I don't think I made this
pronouncement yesterday, I should state that based upon the
testimony presented, the Court is satisfied that jurisdiction
is m

fact proper in this case and that grounds of

irreconcilable differences have been established, warranting
a--a--the granting of a divorce between these parties.
don't think I made that pronouncement yesterdaiy.

I

So, I do so

now.
I'm going to go immediately to the issue of alimony
and this is how I have resolved that particular issue.

First

of all, I'd like to state for the record that I have
4

1

considered all of the required Jones factors.

2

also taken into consideration how these parties are

3

respectively employed.

4

consideration the age of these parties and I--I've also taken

5

into consideration and this Court has in fact found that this

6

is in fact, a long term marriage.

7

I've obviously

Additionally, I've taken into

Based upon the evidence presented, Counsel, I have

8

found, for alimony purposes, the petitioner's gross income to

9

be in the approximate amount of $3,137.

Additionally, based

10

upon the evidence presented, I have also found, and obviously,

11

I have made some adjustments, but I have found that the

12

petitioner's reasonable and necessary expenses are in the

13

approximate total amount of $3,461; consequently, I am finding

14

that petitioner does have a shortfall in the amount of $324.

15

So, she does have that amount of unmet need.

16

Additionally, for alimony purposes, I am finding

17

that the respondent has gross income in the approximate amount

18

of $6,760 and that he has reasonable monthly expenses in the

19

approximate amount of $4,372.

20

respondent has the ability to pay alimony; consequently, I'm

21

awarding the petitioner alimony in this case in the amount of

22

$324, consistent with the standard limitations and

23

restrictions and by that, I simply mean subject to remarriage,

24

cohabitation, for the duration of the term of the parties'

25

marriage.

So, I am finding that the

5

I'm going to go next to the issue of personal
property.
Excuse me.

I needed to take a sip of water.

Regarding the issue of personaL property, I have
resolved that issue as follows:
Can both of you still hear me?
MR. McPHIE:

I can.

MR. READING:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

Good.

I'm resolving this issue as follows:

I am going to

find that it is equitable to affirm the division of the
personal property as the parties--as exists between the
parties as of the date of trial, as the parties have divided
that personal property.

So, I am affirming that distribution

and division as equitable, with the following exceptions, and
those exceptions are these:
The 1997 Blazer is kind of a little difficult for me
to characterize and what I mean by that, it has some
characteristics of being separate property, since I am finding
that it came to the respondent by way of the death of his
father.

The vehicle has always been titled m

his name, yet,

at the same time, for a fairly lengthy period of time, it
appears as if that--the petitioner had the substantial, full
use of that vehicle.

And I am finding, obviously, that

marital assets were used for the maintenance a.nd upkeep on
6

1

that vehicle, even if it is a 1997 Chevy Blazer.

2

But because of that mixed type of character, I am

3

going to award the 1997 Blazer to the respondent, free and

4

clear from any claim or interest m

5

petitioner, in part, because of its, what I'm describing to be

6

it's, in part, it's non-marital asset character because of the

7

manner m

which this property was held by way of title and the

8

manner m

which it has come to the respondent.

9

the vehicle by the

Additionally, I'm making this award of the Blazer to

10

the respondent, m

11

personal property distribution that the Court has affirmed

12

here just a moment ago.

13

part, as an equitable set-off against the

The other exception regarding this personal property

14

distribution will be as to the piano, which accordingly--

15

according to the evidence presented, has a value of

16

approximately $7,000.

17

piece of property is as follows-

18

otherwise m

19

equally.

20

to the possession and control of the piano.

21

be required to share equally m

22

maintaining the piano.

23

And how I'm going to deal with that
Unless the parties agree

writing, the piano is awarded to both parties

The petitioner will have the right and opportunity
The parties will

any costs of repair or

Additionally, the parties will share equally m any

24

appreciation or increased value m

the piano.

And then I'm

25

going to order that the piano be sold--ordered to be sold upon
7

1

the last minor child reaching the age of majority.

2
3

Those are the only exceptions to the personal
property distribution.

4

The next issue I'm going to address deals with the

5

issue of pick up and delivery of the children and I'm going to

6

resolve this issue in this manner.

7

the most equitable thing for me to do is to resolve this issue

8

by maintaining the status quo, which results in the respondent

9

being responsible for pick up and delivery of the minor

10

I'm of the opinion that

children when exercising his visitation.

11

The reason why I'm persuaded that that is the--

12

maintaining the status quo is the most appropriate way to

13

resolve this issue, because it's readily apparent from the

14

evidence presented, that these minor children are engaged

15

various extracurricular activities and it is tne petitioner,

16

for the most part, is responsible for the transportation for

17

those extracurricular activities and in an attempt to resolve

18

this issue equitably, I'm going to maintain the status quo

19

m

I'm not sure this is--this still remains to be an

20

issue for me to resolve.

21

resolved by way of stipulation and this deals with the issue

22

of the petitioner's request to pick up the minor children from

23

the respondent, to have them attend church and then return the

24

children.

25

MR

McPHIE:

I--I think this next issue was

We've agreed to that.

1
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

I thought that that was resolved

by way of stipulation, so that--it's not--

3

MR. READING:

That is true, your Honor.

The only

4

caveat would be is if he--if he happened to have another

5

activity planned for that day or was going to be out of town

6

with the kids, I mean--

7

MR. McPHIE:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. McPHIE:

That was also agreed.
Okay.

And since that--

If he's going out of town, then she

10

can't say, you can't take them 'cause it's Sunday, but if he's

11

m

town--

12

MR. READING:

13

MR. McPHIE:

14

MR. READING:

15

THE COURT:

16

And not fishing-Yeah.
--they--they need to go.
Well, are you sure you--if you're sure

you have a stipulation as to that issue, I won't say anymore.

17

MR. READING:

18

THE COURT:

I think that's on the record that way.
Okay.

Now, let me go next to the issue

19

that deals with the respondent's request for the equal sharing

20

of taxes incurred for the 2005-2006 tax year.

21

based upon an increase m

22

alleged that that sum to be, I think in the approximate amount

23

of two--total amount of $2,137.

24
25

I think this is

the Scott Trade accounts.

It was

Listen, I'm going to require that the petitioner
share equally one-half of that debt, but that needs to be
9

documented.
MR. McPHlE:
THE COURT:
to share m

Not a problem, your Honor
I'm also going to require the petitioner

one-half of the cell phone bill, the cell phone

bill was $74.57, one-half of the medical expense bill, which
is--was in the total of $31.94.

I'm denying the respondent's

request that the petitioner share m

the--any expense for the

air conditioning bill.
Going next to what I think will be the last issue,
is the respondent's request that he receive four percent
interest on his equitable lien.

I struggled with this request

for some time, until I located some Utah case law that appears
to clearly hold that awarding interest on an ecjuitable lien is
not appropriate.
And you should know that I am relying on two cases,
the first case is a domestic relations case and I probably
will mispronounce the name of the case, I think is Osguthorpe
vs. Osguthorpe and the case is found at 804 P. 2d 530.

It's a

19 90 Utah Court of Appeals case.
Also, that Osguthorpe case is upheld m

a subsequent

case of Lovato vs. Lovato, which is a 2002 Utah Court of
Appeals case, the cite on that case is 2002 Utah Appeals 162.
And the general holdings of those two opinions is as
follows:

That an equitable lien is unlike a judgment and only

gives the lienholder a right to collect the debt out of the
10

1

charged property.

In those cases, the court held that

2

interest could not accrue until the equitable lien was reduced

3

to judgment, after the happening of one of the contingencies

4

that will result m

5

Until that occurs, interest on equitable lien is not

6

appropriate and m

7

trial court was reversed for awarding interest on an equitable

8

lien.

9

respondent's request.

10

MR. McPHIE:

11

THE COURT:

reducing the equitable lien to a judgment.

the--m both cases that I cited to you, the

So, I'm going to follow that direction and deny the

Okay.
I think that that resolves all the

12

issues with the exception of maybe one and that would be the

13

issue of attorney's fees.

14

now?

15
16

MR. READING:

And do you wish me to resolve that

If you're in a position that you can

do that, sure.

17

MR. McPHIE:

18

THE COURT:

If you're m

a position to do it, sure.

From my vantage point, based upon the

19

evidence presented, although I recognize that there is a

20

disparity m

21

conclude and find that it is most equitable for this Court to

22

order that the parties be responsible for their own attorney's

23

fees m

24

any necessity to require either side to submit affidavits

25

support.

the incomes of--of these parties, I would

this particular case.

Consequently, I would not find
m

11

1

MR. McPHIE:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. McPHIE:

4

Do you want me to prepare this?

5

McPhie talking.

6
7

Okay.
I think that that's it.
I think that is.
This is David

Sorry.

THE COURT:

That's fine.

But I would like to see

the documents come to me--

8

MR. McPHIE:

9

THE COURT:

I'll submit them to opposing counsel -Yeah.

They need to be signed off at

10

least as to form and definitely as to form and content as to

11

the matters that were stipulated to.

12

saying?

13

MR. READING:

Yeah.

Okay.

Do you see what I'm

And your Honor, at this

14

point, a clarification.

15

mentioned that the petitioner had $3,13 7, that included, I

16

guess, the child support?

17

MR. McPHIE:

18

THE COURT:

19

support m

20

h e r income.

21
22
23
24
25

Back to the alimony issue, you

No.
No.

I did not include that child

the calculation and I cited it as a gross amount

MR. READING:

of

And--and so that was not taken into

account to help pay those expenses?
THE COURT:

It was taken into account, but it was

not included by me as income for alimony purposes.
MR. READING:

Okay.
12

THE COURT:

Any other points of clarification?

MR. McPHIE:
THE COURT:

We'll submit this to you pre-approved.
Mr. Reading?

MR. READING:

That--I think that was the only

on I had, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Hey, listen, thank

ry much.
MR. READING:
THE COURT:
MR. READING:

Thank you.
Okay.

Bye.

Bye, now.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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